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Louis FISHERI
The treaty power in the United States Constitution is both explicit
and inexplicable. The bare outlines of this power are readily available.
Article II, section 2, empowers the President, "by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur . . . ." Article I, section 10, prohibits states
from entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. That section
also prohibits a state, without the consent of Congress, from entering
into "any Agreement or Compact" with a foreign power. And finally,
the supremacy clause in article VI defines treaties, along with the Con-
stitution and statutes, as "the supreme Law of the Land."1
These passages say nothing about the President's freedom to nego-
tiate treaties single-handedly, although that was later argued by some
commentators. The Constitution is also silent about the process of ter-
minating a treaty, or the allocation of authority to interpret and/or re-
interpret a treaty. And nothing is said about the role of the House of
Representatives, which not only provides funds to implement treaties
but must also guard against treaties that usurp its prerogatives, espe-
cially over foreign commerce. On all those questions, and others, his-
tory and custom have gradually filled in the picture, but many corners
of the treaty power remain obscure.
This commentary focuses on two questions; the first is discussed in
detail in this forum, while the other has received only scant attention.
First, what exactly is the Senate's role in treaty-making and interpreta-
tion? Is it excluded from the process of negotiation and invited only at
the last minute to accept or reject the President's finished project? Sec-
ondly, what role does the House of Representatives play, given its
power to provide authorizations and appropriations?
t Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress. B.S., 1956, College of William and Mary; Ph.D., New School for
Social Research. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should
not be interpreted as positions of the Congressional Research Service. This article is
based on a paper presented at a conference on "Treaty Implementation and Interpreta-
tion Under the Constitution", sponsored by the American Bar Association (Standing
Committee on Law and National Security) and Syracuse College of Law, March 10-
11, 1989.
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; art. I, § 10, cls. I & 3; art. VI, cI. 2.
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I. NEGOTIATING TREATIES
A. The Historical Myth of the Presidential Monopoly
The process of drafting and negotiating a treaty is often called a
"presidential monopoly," to use the words of Professor Edward S.
Corwin.2 Justice Sutherland, writing the opinion for United States v.
Curtiss-Wright, claimed that the President "alone negotiates. Into the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it."3 These assertions, however, are not supported
by the text of the Constitution, the debates at the Philadelphia conven-
tion, or the precedents established during the Washington
administration.
With regard to the constitutional text, the treaty-making process is
not divided into two stages that are exclusive and sequential: negotia-
tion by the President followed by Senate action. The President "makes"
treaties, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.' The consti-
tutional language for the treaty process is markedly different than for
appointments, which does depend on exclusive and sequential stages.
The Constitution provides that the President "shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States . . . ." Here the President's
authority to nominate is set apart solely as an executive responsibility.
No such division of authority is mandated by the treaty process.
The phrase "advice and consent" implies that the Senate will have
an opportunity to shape the content of a treaty. If it had been the intent
of the framers to limit the Senate to voting yes or no to a treaty pre-
pared exclusively by the President, the word "advice" is superfluous
and the phrase should have been reduced to a simple "consent."
The first President, George Washington, did not assume that the
process of making treaties was a "presidential monopoly." When he
first communicated to the Senate regarding the appropriate procedure
for treaties, he stated that oral communications with the Senate "seem
indispensably necessary; because in these a variety of matters are con-
tained, all of which not only require consideration, but some of them
2 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVC., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. REP. No.
16, 99th Cong., 1st sess. 496 (1982). This document originated in 1952 as a Corwin
product. See also E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: THE OFFICE AND POWERS 21112
(1957).
3 299 U.S 304, 319 (1936).




may undergo much discussion; to do which by written communication
would be tedious without being satisfactory." 6 Significantly, Washing-
ton concluded that his actions on nominations should be done only by
written messages. 7 He thus appeared to invite the Senate to shape the
content of treaties. A subsequent letter from Washington to the Senate
seems to underscore his concept of partnership: "In the appointment to
offices, the agency of the Senate is purely executive, and they may be
summoned to the President. In treaties, the agency is perhaps as much
of a legislative nature and the business may possibly be referred to their
deliberations in their legislative chamber."'
Washington's distinction is consistent with the difference in consti-
tutional text already discussed. His position echoes that of Alexander
Hamilton, in Federalist 75, who observed that the power of making
treaties "will be found to partake more of the legislative than of the
executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the
definition of either of them."9 The similarity between this language and
Washington's letter suggests that the author in each case may have
been Hamilton. The important point is that both Washington and
Hamilton regarded the treaty power as more legislative than executive.
Washington and Hamilton knew that for more than four out of
the five months at the Philadelphia Convention the Framers gave the
Senate exclusive power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors.10 Af-
ter the Great Compromise established a House of Representatives
based on population while giving each state two senators elected by
state legislatures, there was fear that an aristocratic Senate might abuse
its powers. As a necessary check, the President was added to the treaty-
making and appointment process. To now argue that the Constitution
vests in the President an overriding power to make treaties is contrary
to what the Framers wanted. They did not adopt the British model or
John Locke's "federative" power, which placed external powers solely
in the hands of the Executive. 1 As Hamilton explained in Federalist
69, the President only had "concurrent power with a branch of the
legislature in the formation of treaties," whereas the British King "is
6 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 373 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1937) [here-
inafter WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON].
7 Id. at 374.
8 Id. at 378.
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 450 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
10 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 155,
169, 183, 197-98, 392-94 (1966).
"I Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abroga-
tion of Treaties - the Original Intent of the Framers and the Constitution Histori-
cally Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1, 40-41, 73-77 (1979).
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the sole possessor of the power of making treaties."12
There is little evidence that anyone at that time regarded the nego-
tiation of treaties as a "presidential monopoly." It is true that John
Jay, in Federalist 64, wrote that the negotiation of treaties sometimes
requires "perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch," justifying certain
executive initiatives.1x In general, however, Jay said about treaties that
the President "must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of
the Senate . -* "" James Madison told his colleagues at the Virginia
ratifying convention that "the object of treaties is the regulation of in-
tercourse with foreign nations, and is external."1 The regulation of
intercourse with foreign governments dovetails so closely with the du-
ties of Congress, especially over foreign commerce, that it is untenable
to assert that the President could exclusively draft treaties without any
legislative involvement.
That conclusion is strengthened by the communications from
Washington to the Senate. When he discussed the treaty process he
referred to presidential ideas as "propositions" put to the Senate for
consideration.16 His choice of language suggests that treaty proposals
were just that: proposals that could be changed and improved by
senators.
He sent a message to the Senate on August 21, 1789, stating his
intention to meet with senators in the Senate Chamber "to advise with
them on the terms of the treaty to be negotiated with the Southern
Indians. 1' 7 Washington met with senators the following day. He put to
the senators a series of questions, requesting advice on the instructions
to be given to the commissioners selected to negotiate the treaty."i The
disappointments experienced by both sides have often been recounted.
The Senators did not want to rely solely on the information provided
by the Secretary of War, who had accompanied Washington. The noise
from the carriages traveling past made it difficult to follow the discus-
sion. When the Senators announced that they would not commit them-
selves to any positions that day, Washington felt inconvenienced by the
trip. He returned two days later and obtained the Senate's answers to
his questions and consent to the treaty, but he never again went to seek
12 THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 422 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (em-
phasis in original).
"8 Id. No. 64, at 392 (J. Jay) (emphasis in original).
14 Id. at 393.
15 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 514
(Philadelphia 1836).
18 See WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, supra note 6, at 378.
17 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 67 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (emphasis added).
18 Id. at 69-71.
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the advice of Senators to a treaty draft.1 9
It is error to conclude from this unhappy incident that Washington
and future Presidents thereafter excluded the Senate from the negotia-
tion process. Washington continued to seek the advice of Senators, but
he did that through written communications rather than personal
appearances.20
This practice continued under later presidents. President Andrew
Jackson understood the value of seeking the advice of Senators on how
best to pursue treaty negotiations. On May 6, 1830, he submitted to the
Senate "propositions" for a treaty with the Choctaw Indians. He indi-
cated the amendments he thought necessary, but elicited the Senate's
views: "Not being tenacious though, on the subject, I will most cheer-
fully adopt any modifications which, on a frank interchange of opinions
my Constitutional advisors may suggest and which I shall be satisfied
are reconcilable with my official duties."'" Similar to Washington,
Jackson asked the opinion of the Senate on a series of questions regard-
ing the proposed treaty. Of the reasons he gave for seeking the Senate's
advice, two are of special interest. First, the Indians requested that
their propositions be submitted to the Senate. Second, the Senate's
opinion "will have a salutary effect in a future negotiation, if one
should be deemed proper."2 2 Obtaining the Senate's views, according to
Jackson:
on this important and delicate branch of our future negotia-
tions would enable the President to act much more effectively
in the exercise of his particular functions. There is also the
best reason to believe that measures in this respect emanat-
ing from the united counsel of the treaty-making power
would be more satisfactory to the American people and to
the Indians.2"
Several weeks later the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs re-
sponded to Jackson's request. The Committee offered its opinion that
President Jackson ought to withhold his sanction to the treaty until the
full sense of the Choctaw nation "could be fairly taken."2 4 The com-
19 W. MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DEBATE IN THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES 122-26 (1880).
20 See 1 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 64-
65, 68-69, 71-72, 81-84, 110-113, 115 (J. Richardson ed. 1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES
OF THE PRESIDENTS].
11 4 J. SEN. EXEC. PROC. 98 (1887).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 111.
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mittee also stated its belief that the proposed treaty terms were "so
unreasonable" that the United States should not agree to them even if
the Choctaw nation agreed to the terms unanimously.25 Finally, the
committee thought it inadvisable to decide further details on the treaty
"in advance of any negotiation," for such specifications might be self-
defeating in eventually reaching an acceptable treaty. 6
President James K. Polk also invited the Senate's advice on negoti-
ating a treaty. He regarded the Senate as a "branch of the treaty-mak-
ing power, and by consulting them in advance of his own action upon
important measures of foreign policy which may ultimately come before
them for their consideration the President secures harmony of action
between that body and himself."1
27
Over the years, Senators have been asked to approve the appoint-
ment of treaty negotiators and even to advise on their negotiating in-
structions.28 What this brief survey of history reveals is that far from
being a presidential monopoly, the negotiation of treaties is often shared
with the Senate in order to build legislative understanding and
support.2 9
This statement, of course, does not deny that there have been peri-
ods of tension and confrontation between the branches over this subject.
A famous example is Woodrow Wilson and the Versailles Treaty. Wil-
son believed that the President should not consult with the Senate and
treat it as an equal partner. Writing as an academic, he advised Presi-
dents to negotiate treaties on their own and then drop the finished
product in the Senate's lap as afait accompli. According to his calcula-
tion, legislative acquiescence would be compelled by getting the country
"so pledged in the view of the world to certain courses of action, that
the Senate hesitates to bring about the appearance of dishonor which
would follow its refusal to ratify the rash promises or to support the
indiscreet threats of the Department of State." 0 These words of Pro-
fessor Wilson proved far too clever, as President Wilson was later to
learn with the Versailles Treaty. 1 Wilson's experience has not been
25 Id.
26 Id. at 112.
27 See 5 MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 20, at 2299.
28 T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 136 (1979).
21 See 2 G. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 576-602 (1938).
0 W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 233-34 (1885). Similar views ap-
pear in his W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
77-78 (1908).
"i Wilson's thesis has been decisively refuted in Black, The United States Senate
and the Treaty Power, 4 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1 (1931); Webb, Treaty-Making and
the President's Obligation to Seek the Advice and Consent of the Senate with Special
Reference to the Vietnam Peace Negotiations, 31 OHIo ST. L. J. 490 (1970).
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unique; other Presidents who attempted to commit the nation unilater-
ally to international agreements discovered that the Senate has ample
resources to retaliate by tacking on amendments, shelving treaties, or
rejecting them outright.3 2
Aware of this potential problem, Presidents such as William Mc-
Kinley, Warren Harding, and Herbert Hoover have included Senators
and Representatives as members of United States delegations that nego-
tiate treaties.3" The lesson of Wilson's failure to include Senators in the
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and the subsequent failure of
the Versailles Treaty has not been lost. During the negotiations of the
North Atlantic Treaty, Senators Thomas Connally and Arthur Van-
denburg were with Secretary of State Dean Acheson "all the time,"
and Senator Walter George actually wrote one of the treaty provi-
sions.3" Members of Congress attend international conferences and
serve as delegates to the North Atlantic Assembly, the Interparlia-
mentary Union and other interparliamentary groups, and are ap-
pointed as United States Representatives to the U.N. General Assem-
bly. The Carter Administration consulted with at least seventy Senators
during the final phase of the negotiations of the Panama Canal
Treaty.3 5 And during negotiations on arms control agreements, mem-
bers of Congress participate either as advisors or observers. During
1977 and 1978, twenty-six Senators served in Geneva as official advis-
ers to the SALT II negotiating team. 38 The same practice continued
under the Reagan Administration.
B. The Sole Organ Theory
In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland attempted to bolster his ar-
gument that the President alone negotiates by developing the now-fa-
mous "sole organ" theory. He quoted a sentence from John Marshall
on March 7, 1800, made during debate in the House of Representa-
32 See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 28, at 136-37.
33 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvC., LIBRARY OF CONG., PREPARED FOR THE
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. PRINT No. 205, 98th
Cong., 2d sess. 98 (1984).
"I Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information from the Executive;
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 262-64
(1971). See also Heindel, The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate, 43
AM. J. INT'L L. 633 (1949).
35 Destler, Treaty Troubles: Versailles in Reverse, 35 FOREIGN POL'Y 45, 50
(Winter 1978-79).
" Destler, Executive-Congressional Conflict in Foreign Policy: Explaining It,
Coping With It, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 310 (L. Dodd & B. Oppenheimer eds.
1981).
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tives. While Marshall said that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations,' 3 7 Sutherland took the sole-organ theory a step further by us-
ing it to advocate inherent powers for the President in foreign affairs.
He speaks of the President's power "as the organ of the federal govern-
ment in the field of international relations-a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress .... ""
From these fragments Sutherland implies that Marshall promoted
an exclusive, independent power for the President in foreign affairs,
but that was never Marshall's intent. Marshall never suggested that the
President makes foreign policy unilaterally, for he knew that foreign
policy is shaped jointly by the President and Congress. When one reads
Marshall's sentence in the context of the month-long House debate, it
is evident that the President acts as "sole organ" only after Congress
establishes national policy, either by statute or treaty. Nothing in Mar-
shall's statement endorses inherent presidential powers in foreign af-
fairs. In the particular dispute in the House, national policy had been
set by an extradition treaty with England and Marshall defended the
right of President John Adams to execute that treaty in his capacity as
"sole organ of the nation in its external relations .... ""
If Marshall cannot be used as a prop for Sutherland's theory,
neither is Thomas Jefferson any help. His statement in 1790 that the
"transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether" 0
seems consistent with Sutherland's position, but when his statement is
read in full, Jefferson did not mean anything other than what John
Marshall declared ten years later: that after foreign policy has been
established by the President and the Senate through the treaty power,
or by the President and Congress through the statutory process, the
President is the exclusive party in transacting and executing national
policy. Similarly, in 1804 Jefferson said that the Constitution "has
made the Executive the organ for managing our intercourse with for-
eign nations,""1 and yet the context of this lengthy statement acknowl-
edges that Congress has the power to place "a temporary trust to the
President, which could be put an end to if abused.""
This lack of rhetorical support for the sole organ theory is paral-
leled by historical practice as outlined above. Thus, Justice Suther-
37 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting John Marshall in 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 613 (1800)).
8 Id. at 320.
8 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800).
40 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379 (Boyd ed. 1961).
' 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 5 (Mem. ed. 1904).
42 Id. at 11.
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land's dicta should be read merely as an assertion that lacks a doctrinal
and historical basis.
II. HOUSE PREROGATIVES
Professor Koplow's Article is silent about the participation of the
House .of Representatives in the treaty-making process. It is true that
the idea of co-equal status for the House was considered and rejected
by the Framers both during the Philadelphia Convention and during
the ratification debates.4 For example, during the convention it was
proposed that the House be included with the Senate in giving advice
and consent to treaties. The proposal lost handily, ten states opposed
and one in favor."
Some of the framers objected to any involvement by the House of
Representatives in the treaty process. In Federalist 75, Hamilton said
that the "fluctuating and ... multitudinous composition" of the House
necessarily excluded it from a position of trust: "[a]ccurate and compre-
hensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adher-
ence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national char-
acter; decision, secrecy, and dispatch, are incompatible with the genius
of a body so variable and so numerous."45 In Federalist 64, Jay
claimed that decisions on treaties should be placed in the hands of the
Senate, whose members would be chosen by the "select assemblies" of
state legislatures and presumably would possess greater expertise than
members of the House.46
Jay's logic became less compelling after the seventeenth amend-
ment subjected senators to popular election. Jay had also argued that
the small size of the Senate permitted greater secrecy and dispatch than
the House. But by 1859 the Senate had grown from twenty-six mem-
bers to sixty-six, or larger than the original House membership of
43 Several delegates at the Philadelphia Convention recommended that treaties be
subjected to action by both houses rather than simply by the Senate. They reasoned
that treaties, accorded the status of law under the Constitution, required approval by
the entire Congress. Gouverneur Morris proposed that "no Treaty shall be binding on
the U.S. which is not ratified by law." See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 10, at 392.
Madison thought this would be too inconvenient for some treaties, such as treaties of
alliance during time of war. The Morris motion was defeated, eight states opposed and
one (Morris' state of Pennsylvania) in favor. Id. In Philadelphia, Madison did wonder
whether a distinction might not be made between different kinds of treaties, allowing
the President and the Senate to make treaties "eventual and of Alliance for limited
terms," and requiring the concurrence of both Houses for other treaties. Id.
" See id. at 538.
" THE FEDERALiST No. 75, at 452 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (em-
phasis in original).
"' Id. No. 64, at 391 (J. Jay).
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sixty-five. These changes prompted the House in 1945 to adopt a reso-
lution, passed by the margin of 288 to 88, to amend the Constitution to
provide for treaty ratification by a majority of both Houses. Not unex-
pectedly, the Senate never acted on the bill.
47
Although the Constitution continues to exclude the House from
the treaty process, the dependence of treaties on appropriations makes
the House a major player. This is reflected in historical practice. In
offering a resolution requesting President Washington to send docu-
ments on the Jay Treaty to the House, Congressman Edward Living-
ston insisted that the House possessed "a discretionary power of carry-
ing the Treaty into effect, or refusing it their sanction." '48 Congressman
Albert Gallatin elaborated on Livingston's position. The exercise of the
treaty-making power might clash with certain powers specifically dele-
gated to Congress by the Constitution, such as the authority to regulate
foreign trade. 9 Gallatin added that the treaty power was limited by
"the general power of granting money, also vested in Congress .... 2 0
The argument was based on the notion that unless the House made
clear its power to reject treaties of a certain character, its prerogatives
could be usurped whenever the President, two-thirds of the Senate, and
a foreign country reached agreement.
Livingston's resolution passed by a vote 62 to 37.61 Nevertheless,
Washington denied the request on the ground that the Constitution
limited legislative participation in treaty matters to the Senate. 2 The
House later adopted a resolution stating these principles:
when a Treaty stipulates regulations of any of the subjects
submitted by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it
must depend, for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a
law or laws to be passed by Congress. And it is the Constitu-
tional right and duty of the House of Representatives, in all
such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency
of carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act
thereon, as, in their judgment, may be most conducive to the
public good."3
47 91 CONG. REC. 4326-68 (1945). For a House critique of the Senate's record in
the treaty process, see H.R. REP. No. 2061, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
48 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 428 (1796).
49 Id. at 437.
50 Id. at 466.
51 Id. at 759-60.
52 See 1 MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 20, at 186-88.
11 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (1796). This language has been adopted on other
occasions, such as on April 20, 1871, see 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS § 1523 (1907). See
also Stone, The House of Representatives and the Treaty-Making Power, 17 Ky. L.J.
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This has proven to be no mere rhetorical flourish. The involve-
ment of the House of Representatives in agreements reached between
the United States and other countries was conspicuous with the Louisi-
ana Purchase. Congress had appropriated $2 million to be applied to-
ward the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas5 4 President Jef-
ferson, uncertain of his authority, proceeded to reach an agreement
with France to buy the whole of Louisiana. Congressional support for
the treaty obviously required more than the advice and consent of the
Senate. Both Houses of Congress would have to provide additional
funds. With this in mind, Jefferson sent copies of the ratified treaty to
both Houses, acknowledging: "You will observe that some important
conditions can not be carried into execution but with the aid of the
Legislature, and that time presses a decision on them without delay.",
Congress passed legislation enabling Jefferson to take possession of the
Louisiana Territory
5 6
Treaties that depend on appropriations have been blocked by the
House of Representatives. Two examples serve to illustrate the danger
of ignoring the House: the Alaskan purchase treaty with Russia in
1867;57 and the assertion of House prerogatives over Indian matters. 8
The potential overlap between the treaty power and House pre-
rogatives over foreign commerce and tariffs resulted in another asser-
tion of House authority in 1880. The House declared that the negotia-
tion of a commercial treaty that fixed the rates of duty to be imposed on
foreign imports would be "an infraction of the Constitution and an in-
vasion of one of the highest prerogatives of the House of Representa-
217 (1929) (arguing for a greater role in the treaty-making process for the House of
Representatives).
54 Ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 202 (1803).
5 1 Messages of the Presidents, supra note 20, at 362-63 (Oct. 21, 1803).
58 Ch. 1, 2 Stat. 245 (1803); ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283 (1804).
57 See S. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 210-11
(1916); See also 2 G. HAYNES, supra note 29, at 689-90.
58 For almost a century, Indian tribes were treated as independent nations and
subjected to the treaty-making power of the President and the Senate. However, the
Constitution also empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. .. ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. Partly because of corruption and mismanagement in the Office of Indian Affairs, the
House of Representatives began to object to its exclusion from Indian affairs. In 1869,
the Senate added funds to an appropriations bill to fulfill Indian treaties it had ap-
proved, but the House refused to grant the funds. See F. COHEN, FELIX COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 66 (1971). The House completed its reassertion
two years later by enacting this language: "Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation
or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as
an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty ...... Ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (1871).
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tives. '"59 Three years later a commercial treaty with Mexico contained
language making its validity dependent on action by both Houses of
Congress.6" Although subsequent treaties extended the time available
for congressional approval, the House did not support the treaty and it
was not implemented.61
III. CONCLUSION
If they wish, Presidents may keep the negotiation of treaties a
purely executive matter. Certainly they may treat the nomination stage
as an executive prerogative. Although such strict interpretations have
some basis of support in the constitutional text and our history, to pro-
ceed in this fashion invites major risks and costs for the presidency.
Submitting nominations informally to the Senate, before announcing
the names, is a healthy way to avoid embarrassment for an administra-
tion. By taking the Senate into his confidence, a President may obtain
useful information to guide his actions on treaties as well as nomina-
tions. Such actions are not constitutionally compelled; they are merely
smart. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the President and his as-
sistants from following intelligent and constructive procedures.
The treaty power, like other powers in the Constitution, repre-
sents a composite of many forces. It is defined partly by the constitu-
tional text, but that does little more than open the door to issues that
beg further definition. The treaty power is shaped by a rich and chang-
ing dialectic among text, historical forces, and executive-legislative
practices. Each branch must articulate its own constitutional interpreta-
tion of the treaty power. In this exchange it is important for the partici-
pants in the debate to have a profound understanding of constitutional
principles and institutional needs. The ultimate objective of the treaty
process is to enter into foreign commitments capable of being sustained.
To honor those promises, especially those that commit the nation's eco-
nomic and military resources, it is necessary for the President to de-
velop a consensus with both branches of Congress by seeking their ad-
vice throughout the process of negotiating and making a treaty.
11 2 HINDS' Precedents § 1524 (1907).
60 24 Stat. 975, 983 [Art. VIII] (1883).
61 25 Stat. 1370, 1371 (1885). See also 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS § 1526-1528.
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